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Ea st As i a
E L I Z A B E T H  A T T AN 
With the end of the reign of the Manchus who gov-
erned the Chinese Empire for three centuries, and
with the advent of the Republic (1911), the minority
issue took on a dimension impossible to imagine in
1 9t h-century China. Aware of the fragility of national
cohesion in this immense land of heterogeneous
population groups, Sun Yatsen, founder of the Re-
public, still minimized the influence of minorities, af-
firming the supremacy of the Han, the majority eth-
nic group and founders of one of the first Chinese dy-
nasties. The question of numbers quickly became a
focus of debate. Proclaiming that, of a population to-
tal of 400 million inhabitants at the time, the minori-
ties represented only slightly more than 10 million,
Sun Yatsen implicitly called upon them to disappear
into the Chinese melting pot. The statistics published
at the time, however, contradicted the PresidentÕs
assertions by listing 26 million non-Han Chinese. 
Fertility and
I d e n t i t y :
Muslims in Xinjiang
In China, the 55 national minorities (m i n z u)
recognized (nearly 120 million persons to-
day, 10% of the total population) are identi-
fied on the basis of ethnic, cultural, and Ð
paradoxical for a country led by an officially
atheist party Ð religious criteria. Ten of the
55 minorities are adepts of Islam, the most
important of which together constitute a to-
tal of 18 million persons: Hui (approximately
9 million), Uygurs (7.5), Kazakhs (1.2) and
Kirghizes (0.2). 
The ÔcookedÕ and the ÔrawÕ
The Hui, descendants of Arab and Persian
merchants that had settled by the thou-
sands in China beginning in the 7t h c e n t u r y ,
and the Muslims of Central and Western
Asia brought by the Mongolian army in the
1 3t h century, belong the category referred
to as the ÔcookedÕ (s h o u, cooked by the civil-
ization, submissive, acculturated). By mar-
riage with Han women, the Hui were able to
assure their reproduction, but this exogamy
led to their rapid sinization: they would no
longer be distinguishable from the Han
(customs, traditions, physical appearance)
apart from their religion, Islam, and the con-
straints which it imposes (dietary prohibi-
tions, particularly severe in the rejection of
pork, the most appreciated meat of the
H a n ) .
Uygurs, Kazakhs and Kirghizes belong to
the category of the ÔrawÕ (s h e n g, unrefined,
independent, having kept their original cul-
ture). Their largest majority being concen-
trated in Xinjiang (Chinese Turkestan), this
category forms the most visible Islamic
community in China. Cousins of the Turkic
speaking Muslims of the ex-Soviet Republic
borders, they speak Turkic languages and
consider Chinese a foreign language; they
have rich cultural traditions, common to
those of Central Asian Muslims, and have
nothing in common with the Han. Their on-
ly connection was made under constraint,
after the capture and annexation of Xinjiang
by the Qing in the 18t h century. 
The communist regime in 1949 broke off,
at least in its discourse, from the homoge-
nizing views of the nationalists by insisting,
contrary the latter, on the multinational
character of China. However, according to
the facts, it was under this regime that the
policy of sinization by population transfer
began to veritably boom. Thus, between the
censuses of 1953 and 1964, the number of
Han in Inner Mongolia had doubled, passing
from 5.1 to 10.7 million. In Xinjiang, the
number had multiplied by seven (from 330
thousand to 2.3 million), and further dou-
bled between 1964 and 1982. More so than
its discourse, these colossal population dis-
placements of Han in the border zones
translate, at best, the strategic fears, and at
worst, the hegemonic views of the central
power. Migration alone, however, does not
suffice. 
Indeed, parallel to this population policy
with its assimilationist aims Ð yet in order to
avoid aggravating the political and strategic
contention Ð China conceded substantial
privileges to the frontier minorities in dem-
ographic terms. This was done, however, at
the risk of seeing, in the end, the effects of
divergent demographic growths jeopardize
Han supremacy in these regions.
Is religion influencing
fertility? 
In a national context of strict limitation of
births, China allows its minorities a much
greater demographic growth than that of
the Han. Accordingly, in the latest popula-
tion census of 1990, Uygur women, Kazakhs
and Kirghizes, had an average of two times
more children than Han women and 1.5
times more than Hui women, the latter
nonetheless being Muslim. These minorities
of Xinjiang have thus not obeyed the gener-
al rule: while there was a rapid decline in fer-
tility rates for the Han (the average number
of children per woman dropped from 5.2 in
1970 to 2.6 in 1990) and for the Hui (5.5 in
1970, 3.1 in 1990), they continued to bring a
higher number of children into the world, 6
in 1970, and still 4.6 in 1990 (Figure 1). 
The behaviours of the Hui, Chinese Mus-
lims, have evolved parallel to those of the
Han, with hardly one child more on average.
Remaining completely disconnected with
the Muslim minorities of Xinjiang, the Hui, a
group that is geographically diffused and
mixed with the Han population, have adopt-
ed as it were the reproductive norms of their
surroundings. The cultural factor has clearly
held pre-eminence over the religious factor:
the Hui, by their fertility, are much closer to
the Han than to their Turkic speaking co-re-
ligionists. 
The phase difference of the Uygurs, Ka-
zakhs and Kirghizes in relation to the Han,
and all the more so in relation to the Hui,
was substantial: throughout the 1980s, the
women of these minorities gave birth to at
least two more children each than the Han
or Hui women. Was this demography, signif-
icantly disconnected from the rest of the na-
tion, to be the precursor of the vague at-
tempts at autonomy or independence that
were to become exacerbated especially in
the decade that followed?
The Chinese birth control policy, more tol-
erant towards its minorities than towards
the Han, played an incontestable role in
widening the gaps in fertility. But that is not
the only reason. Although many Sunni Mus-
lims are critical towards birth control, the
high fertility rates of the people of Xinjiang
are not imputable to a religious factor alone:
we have seen that Islam did not by any
means impede the fertile transition of the
Hui, themselves Sunni Muslims. However,
the high fertility of the Turkic speaking pop-
ulations, which naturally translates into a
more abundant population, seems to rein-
force the centripetal inclination. It is indeed
disconcerting that their fertility is far superi-
or to that of their cousins in the ex-Soviet re-
publics (Uzbekistan, Kirghizstan, etc.) and is
even greater than any other Turkic speaking
area in the world, where fertility has fallen
to a level below those of developing coun-
tries. 
The example of the Hui demonstrates very
well that the stricto sensu religious factor ac-
tually has little influence on the process of
transition in fertility rates. Furthermore, it
leads one to conclude that the atypical be-
haviours of the Xinjiang Muslims entail an-
other dimension, which could well be politi-
cal. 
High fertility to affirm
i d e n t i t y ?
Following the example of other minority
groups aspiring, if not to autonomy, than at
least to obtaining greater recognition, the
Turkic speaking Muslims of Xianjiang seem
to have found, in this high fertility, a means
to affirm their ethnic identity and to rein-
force their resistance to the Han. The Hui,
who are spread across the territory in a rath-
er homogenous fashion, who are today
strongly sinized and have never had their
own territory, greatly differ from the Uygurs,
Kazakhs and Kirghizes, who have cultivated
a strong sense of identity Ð bound to their
geographic concentration in their own terri-
tories where they hold the majority Ð which
has given rise to ethnic, cultural, and even
separatist claims.
Xinjiang (Ônew frontierÕ) has only been
part of China since 1759, when it was con-
quered by the Manchu dynasty. From then
until 1949, only ten generations went by,
which is relatively short when considered in
the light of the collective memory of a peo-
ple, and their sinization is but superficial.
Moreover, contrary to the Hui, these Turkic
speaking peoples had their sights set on
places of Ôhigh civilizationÕ: those being Is-
tanbul, Samarkand or Boukhara, rather than
Peking. During this period, the links with the
central powers remained very loose, to such
an extent that on several occasions Xinjiang
found itself in a situation of quasi independ-
ence. Since 1949, Xinjiang has been increas-
ingly firmly tied with China and is the target
of massive colonization: from 7% in 1953,
the percentage of Han within its total popu-
lation has risen to 40% today. In this con-
text, maintaining a high level of fertility Ð
even higher than that of their Kazakh or Kir-
ghiz neighbours in the ex-Soviet republics,
an average of one child more Ð seems to be
the most elementary means, but perhaps
eventually the most efficient, to resisting
the Chinese invasion. 
China, apparently contravening its own
long-term interests, concedes to minorities
occupying the most sensitive zones of fric-
tion Ð Tibetans of Tibet and Muslims of Xin-
jiang in particular Ð the privileges important
in terms of limitation of births, thus author-
izing a demographic growth far greater
than that of the Han. Because Islam remains,
China being no exception, a political force
to be reckoned with, the Chinese govern-
ment is in a way bound to satisfy the need
for ethnic and religious affirmation of the
peoples of Xinjiang, this region being an im-
portant strategic zone as well as a precious
link to the Muslim world and the oil emir-
ates. Hardly being able to counter their na-
tive traditions, China tried to dilute the ef-
fects of their natural growth rates through
Han immigration. 
However, this policy seems short-sighted.
If the current rhythm of Muslim population
growth in Xinjiang is maintained (+2.5% an-
nually, compared to the +1.5% for the Han)
it will double between 1990 and 2020. It will
then become Ð should the installations of
Han migrants in Xinjiang cease Ð with its 18
million people, a majority of approximately
70% in this region, as compared to its slight-
ly over 50% currently. 
At present, China is attempting to fill in
the gaps by waves of controlled migrations,
and is using repression to maintain its hold
on Xinjiang: closing Koranic schools and
mosques, imprisoning imams, confiscating
religious works, and arresting dissidents.
But can the nation-state resist much longer
the centripetal manifestations, especially
when these receive the reinforcement of
such an impressive demography? '
Figure 1. Evolution of the average number of children per woman for
t h e Han and the principal Muslim ethnic groups, 1970 Ð 1 9 9 0
Source: Attan, E., Courbage, Y.,
(1999), ÔTransitional stages and
identity boundaries: the case
o f ethnic minorities in ChinaÕ,
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